Vigilare: toward snoop-based kernel integrity monitor

  • Authors:
  • Hyungon Moon;Hojoon Lee;Jihoon Lee;Kihwan Kim;Yunheung Paek;Brent Byunghoon Kang

  • Affiliations:
  • Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea;Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, South Korea;Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea;Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, South Korea;Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea;George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

In this paper, we present Vigilare system, a kernel integrity monitor that is architected to snoop the bus traffic of the host system from a separate independent hardware. This snoop-based monitoring enabled by the Vigilare system, overcomes the limitations of the snapshot-based monitoring employed in previous kernel integrity monitoring solutions. Being based on inspecting snapshots collected over a certain interval, the previous hardware-based monitoring solutions cannot detect transient attacks that can occur in between snapshots. We implemented a prototype of the Vigilare system on Gaisler's grlib-based system-on-a-chip (SoC) by adding Snooper hardware connections module to the host system for bus snooping. To evaluate the benefit of snoop-based monitoring, we also implemented similar SoC with a snapshot-based monitor to be compared with. The Vigilare system detected all the transient attacks without performance degradation while the snapshot-based monitor could not detect all the attacks and induced considerable performance degradation as much as 10% in our tuned STREAM benchmark test.