Throttling Viruses: Restricting propagation to defeat malicious mobile code
ACSAC '02 Proceedings of the 18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
New directions in traffic measurement and accounting: Focusing on the elephants, ignoring the mice
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
The click modular router
Design, Implementation and Test of an Email Virus Throttle
ACSAC '03 Proceedings of the 19th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Web tap: detecting covert web traffic
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
BIND: A Fine-Grained Attestation Service for Secure Distributed Systems
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Understanding the network-level behavior of spammers
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Flexible OS support and applications for trusted computing
HOTOS'03 Proceedings of the 9th conference on Hot Topics in Operating Systems - Volume 9
Very fast containment of scanning worms
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Flicker: an execution infrastructure for tcb minimization
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2008
OSLO: improving the security of trusted computing
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
LEET'08 Proceedings of the 1st Usenix Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats
Accountable internet protocol (aip)
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
Not-a-Bot: improving service availability in the face of botnet attacks
NSDI'09 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX symposium on Networked systems design and implementation
Toward trustworthy mobile sensing
Proceedings of the Eleventh Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems & Applications
I am a sensor, and I approve this message
Proceedings of the Eleventh Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems & Applications
TrustVisor: Efficient TCB Reduction and Attestation
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Bootstrapping Trust in Commodity Computers
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Detecting spammers with SNARE: spatio-temporal network-level automatic reputation engine
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
ETTM: a scalable fault tolerant network manager
Proceedings of the 8th USENIX conference on Networked systems design and implementation
Memoir: Practical State Continuity for Protected Modules
SP '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
NetQuery: a knowledge plane for reasoning about network properties
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011 conference
Guaranteeing access in spite of distributed service-flooding attacks
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Security Protocols
Building Verifiable Trusted Path on Commodity x86 Computers
SP '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Wide-area Internet traffic patterns and characteristics
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
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As hardware support for improved endhost security becomes ubiquitous, it is important to consider how network security and performance can benefit from these improvements. If portions of each endhost can be trusted, then network infrastructure no longer needs to arduously and imprecisely reconstruct data already known by the endhosts. Through the design of a general-purpose architecture we call Assayer, we explore issues in providing trusted host-based data, including the balance between useful data and user privacy, and the tradeoffs between security and efficiency. We also evaluate the usefulness of such information in several case studies. We implement and evaluate a basic Assayer prototype. Our prototype requires fewer than 1,000 lines of code on the endhost. Endhosts can annotate their outbound traffic in a few microseconds, and these annotations can be checked efficiently; even packet-level annotations on a gigabit link can be checked with a loss in throughput of only 13.1%.