The POPCORN market—an online market for computational resources
Proceedings of the first international conference on Information and computation economies
The grid: blueprint for a new computing infrastructure
The grid: blueprint for a new computing infrastructure
Formal verification of parallel programs
Communications of the ACM
HPCASIA '04 Proceedings of the High Performance Computing and Grid in Asia Pacific Region, Seventh International Conference
Selfish grid computing: game-theoretic modeling and NAS performance results
CCGRID '05 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid (CCGrid'05) - Volume 2 - Volume 02
Noncooperative load balancing in distributed systems
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Fair Game-Theoretic Resource Management in Dedicated Grids
CCGRID '07 Proceedings of the Seventh IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid
Algorithmic Game Theory
A Cooperative Game Framework for QoS Guided Job Allocation Schemes in Grids
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Cooperation in multi-organization scheduling
Concurrency and Computation: Practice & Experience - Euro-Par 2007
Toward a game-theoretic model of grid systems
TGC'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trustworthly global computing
Coordination mechanisms for selfish multi-organization scheduling
HIPC '11 Proceedings of the 2011 18th International Conference on High Performance Computing
Energy-Aware Scheduling on Multicore Heterogeneous Grid Computing Systems
Journal of Grid Computing
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Computational Grid is a well-established platform that gives an assurance to provide a vast range of heterogeneous resources for high performance computing. Efficient and effective resource management and Grid job scheduling are key requirements in order to optimize the use of the resources and to take full advantage from Grid systems. In this paper, we study the job scheduling problem in Computational Grid by using a game-theoretic approach. Grid resources are usually owned by different organizations which may have different and possibly conflicting concerns. Thus it is a crucial objective to analyze potential scenarios where selfish or cooperative behaviors of organizations impact heavily on global Grid efficiency. To this purpose, we formulate a repeated non-cooperative job scheduling game, whose players are Grid sites and whose strategies are scheduling algorithms. We exploit the concept of Nash equilibrium to express a situation in which no player can gain any profit by unilaterally changing its strategy. We extend and complement our previous work by showing whether, under certain circumstances, each investigated strategy is a Nash equilibrium or not. In the negative case we give a counter-example, in the positive case we either give a formal proof or motivate our conjecture by experimental results supported by simulations and exhaustive search.