KALwEN: a new practical and interoperable key management scheme for body sensor networks

  • Authors:
  • Yee Wei Law;Giorgi Moniava;Zheng Gong;Pieter Hartel;Marimuthu Palaniswami

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Electrical & Electronic Engineering, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC 3010, Australia;School of Computer Science and Mathematics, Free University of Tbilisi, Bedia Street, Nutsubidze Plateau, I Micro District, Tbilisi 0183, Georgia;Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Twente, PO Box 217, 7500 AE, Enschede, The Netherlands;Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Twente, PO Box 217, 7500 AE, Enschede, The Netherlands;Department of Electrical & Electronic Engineering, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC 3010, Australia

  • Venue:
  • Security and Communication Networks
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Key management is the pillar of a security architecture. Body sensor networks (BSNs) pose several challenges–some inherited from wireless sensor networks (WSNs), some unique to themselves–that require a new key management scheme to be tailor-made. The challenge is taken on, and the result is KALwEN, a new parameterized key management scheme that combines the best-suited cryptographic techniques in a seamless framework. KALwEN is user-friendly in the sense that it requires no expert knowledge of a user, and instead only requires a user to follow a simple set of instructions when bootstrapping or extending a network. One of KALwEN's key features is that it allows sensor devices from different manufacturers, which expectedly do not have any pre-shared secret, to establish secure communications with each other. KALwEN is decentralized, such that it does not rely on the availability of a local processing unit (LPU). KALwEN supports secure global broadcast, local broadcast, and local (neighbor-to-neighbor) unicast, while preserving past key secrecy and future key secrecy (FKS). The fact that the cryptographic protocols of KALwEN have been formally verified also makes a convincing case. With both formal verification and experimental evaluation, our results should appeal to theorists and practitioners alike. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.