An analysis of short-term fairness in wireless media access protocols (poster session)
Proceedings of the 2000 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Probability and Computing: Randomized Algorithms and Probabilistic Analysis
Probability and Computing: Randomized Algorithms and Probabilistic Analysis
DOMINO: Detecting MAC Layer Greedy Behavior in IEEE 802.11 Hotspots
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
A game-theoretic study of CSMA/CA under a backoff attack
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
A station strategy to deter backoff attacks in IEEE 802.11 LANs
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
DARWIN: distributed and adaptive reputation mechanism for wireless ad-hoc networks
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Evaluation of detection algorithms for MAC layer misbehavior: theory and experiments
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Selfishness detection for backoff algorithms in wireless networks
WIMOB '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 7th International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications
Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks: Theory, Models, and Applications
Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks: Theory, Models, and Applications
Performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 distributed coordination function
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
IEEE 802.11 protocol: design and performance evaluation of an adaptive backoff mechanism
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A Game-Theoretic Framework for Medium Access Control
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In non-cooperative environments, selfish nodes can take advantage of the mechanisms in place to obtain unfair shares of the network resources. Unfortunately, they may impact the performance of the other nodes. Our objective is to propose a novel IEEE 802.11 medium access control protocol, which can fairly share the resources among cooperative nodes but can retaliate if some selfish ones are present. We first show that the classical jamming method is inappropriate. We then present a novel game theoretical strategy designed to cope with the short-term unfairness of resource sharing. Our reputation-based tit-for-tat mechanism is immune to infrequent misclassification errors and motivates rational selfish nodes to cooperate. It depends on the observation of the nodes' behaviour. If any node misbehaves, the monitoring nodes should adapt and behave themselves selfishly. Thus, rational nodes should not have any other choice than to follow the legitimate behaviour in order to maximise their payoff.