Multiple access protocols: performance and analysis
Multiple access protocols: performance and analysis
An analysis of short-term fairness in wireless media access protocols (poster session)
Proceedings of the 2000 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Average Case Analysis of Algorithms on Sequences
Average Case Analysis of Algorithms on Sequences
Multiple Access in Ad-Hoc Wireless LANs with Noncooperative Stations
NETWORKING '02 Proceedings of the Second International IFIP-TC6 Networking Conference on Networking Technologies, Services, and Protocols; Performance of Computer and Communication Networks; and Mobile and Wireless Communications
DOMINO: a system to detect greedy behavior in IEEE 802.11 hotspots
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
Slotted Aloha as a game with partial information
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
802.11 denial-of-service attacks: real vulnerabilities and practical solutions
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Game theory and the design of self-configuring, adaptive wireless networks
IEEE Communications Magazine
CSMA/CA performance under high traffic conditions: throughput and delay analysis
Computer Communications
Performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 distributed coordination function
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Wireless multihoming modeled as a multi-WLAN game
Proceedings of the 12th ACM international conference on Modeling, analysis and simulation of wireless and mobile systems
An adaptive tit-for-tat strategy for IEEE 802.11 CSMA/CA protocol
International Journal of Security and Networks
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The IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol now prevailing in wireless LANs is vulnerable to selfish backoff attacks consisting in selection of short backoff times in the constituent CSMA/CA procedure. Administrative prevention of such attacks fails in ad hoc configurations, where stations' behavior cannot be mandated. In this paper we take an incentive-oriented game-theoretic approach whereby stations are allowed to maximize their payoffs (achieved success rates). Using a fairly accurate performance model we show that a noncooperative CSMA/CA game then arises with a payoff structure characteristic of a Prisoners' Dilemma. For a repeated CSMA/CA game, a novel SPELL strategy is proposed and shown to yield to simple algorithmic design. Assuming that the stations are rational players and wish to maximize a mean-value-type long-term utility, SPELL is further shown to deter a single attacker by providing a disincentive to deviate from SPELL.