Deriving operational software specifications from system goals
Proceedings of the 10th ACM SIGSOFT symposium on Foundations of software engineering
FAUST: Formal Analysis Using Specification Tools
RE '03 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International Conference on Requirements Engineering
Tropos: An Agent-Oriented Software Development Methodology
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Fluent temporal logic for discrete-time event-based models
Proceedings of the 10th European software engineering conference held jointly with 13th ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on Foundations of software engineering
A pragmatic approach to reasoning about the assurance of safety arguments
SCS '03 Proceedings of the 8th Australian workshop on Safety critical systems and software - Volume 33
Requirements Engineering
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In the context of safety-critical systems, arguing that the system is acceptably safe is a major issue, in particular when facing a certification process. We are developing an approach which aims at providing assurance that safety objectives are met by a system under development. We propose a language to express a safety argumentation together with a semantic definition on which an implementation is based. The ultimate objective is to have means to decide, at the level of requirements, the correctness of an argumentation using a formal and tool supported approach. In this paper, we illustrate our argumentation framework on the problem of safe insertion of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) into the air traffic. The system we consider is a socio-technical organization, which consists of the UAV control systems, and the air traffic management. The support environment built upon existing tools is briefly described.