A Systematic Approach to Safety Case Maintenance
SAFECOMP '99 Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Computer Computer Safety, Reliability and Security
Contract-based justification for COTS component within safety-critical applications
SCS '04 Proceedings of the 9th Australian workshop on Safety critical systems and software - Volume 47
Safety, software architecture and MIL-STD-1760
SCS '06 Proceedings of the eleventh Australian workshop on Safety critical systems and software - Volume 69
Argument-based approach to computer system safety engineering
International Journal of Critical Computer-Based Systems
Formal verification of a safety argumentation and application to a complex UAV system
SAFECOMP'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
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The development of safety critical systems is guided by standards. Many standards require the development of a safety case to demonstrate the acceptability of Safety Critical Systems. The safety case must provide confidence that the system is deemed safe enough to operate. For system components where it is not possible to quantify the associated risks (e.g. software), current standards in the aerospace, rail and defence sectors identify design and safety processes for different Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) or Development Assurance Levels (DALs). The assumption is that components developed against the requirements of higher SILs/DALs will be less prone to critical failures and thus have a lower impact on the safety of the overall system. This paper questions this assumption and instead discusses assurance of the safety argument as a method of demonstrating the confidence that can be placed in a safety case. An industrial case study from the aerospace sector is presented to demonstrate the practical use of the concept.