Software safety: where's the evidence?
SCS '01 Proceedings of the Sixth Australian workshop on Safety critical systems and software - Volume 3
A pragmatic approach to reasoning about the assurance of safety arguments
SCS '03 Proceedings of the 8th Australian workshop on Safety critical systems and software - Volume 33
Recent advances in computational models of natural argument: Research Articles
International Journal of Intelligent Systems - Computational Models of Natural Argumentation
A human–computer debating system prototype and its dialogue strategies: Research Articles
International Journal of Intelligent Systems - Computational Models of Natural Argumentation
Chapter I: Notes on structured programming
Structured programming
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Argumentation in artificial intelligence
Artificial Intelligence
Guest Editors' Introduction: Argumentation Technology
IEEE Intelligent Systems
A Human-Computer Dialogue System for Educational Debate: A Computational Dialectics Approach
International Journal of Artificial Intelligence in Education
Software Engineering
Review: informal logic dialogue games in human-computer dialogue
The Knowledge Engineering Review
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Safety case development is not a post-development activity, rather it should occur throughout the system development lifecycle. The key components in a safety case are safety arguments. Too often, safety arguments are constructed without proper reasoning. Inappropriate reasoning in safety arguments could undermine a system's safety claims, which in turn contributes to safety-related failures of the system. To address this, we argue that informal logic argument schemes have important roles to play in safety arguments construction and review process. Ten commonly used reasoning schemes in computer system safety domain are proposed against the safety engineering literature. The role of informal logic dialogue games in computer system safety arguments reviewing is also discussed and a dialectical model for safety argument review is proposed. It is anticipated that this work will contribute toward the development of computer system safety arguments, and help to move forward the interplay between research in informal logic and research in computer system safety engineering.