Completeness, robustness, and safety in real-time software requirements specification
ICSE '89 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Software engineering
Targeting safety-related errors during software requirements analysis
SIGSOFT '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGSOFT symposium on Foundations of software engineering
Safeware: system safety and computers
Safeware: system safety and computers
Doing hard time: developing real-time systems with UML, objects, frameworks, and patterns
Doing hard time: developing real-time systems with UML, objects, frameworks, and patterns
Software safety: where's the evidence?
SCS '01 Proceedings of the Sixth Australian workshop on Safety critical systems and software - Volume 3
A pragmatic approach to reasoning about the assurance of safety arguments
SCS '03 Proceedings of the 8th Australian workshop on Safety critical systems and software - Volume 33
The HEAT/ACT preliminary safety case: a case study in the use of goal structuring notation
SCS '04 Proceedings of the 9th Australian workshop on Safety critical systems and software - Volume 47
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Integrating modern aircraft stores, particularly weapons, creates a complex system of systems challenge. The traditional approach to such integrations was for each to be a stand-alone program. For each program a unique interface would usually be implemented, usually also with a set of unique problems, such as the missile 'ghosting' problems experienced during the F-16 to AMRAAM integration (Ward 1993). In response to the problems of such an approach MIL-STD-1760 an Interface Standard for Aircraft to Store Electrical Interconnection System was released by the US DoD to standardise aircraft/store interfaces. This paper discusses the advantages and limitations of the architectural techniques of MIL-STD-1760. A hierarchical method for integrating the use of the standard into a safety case is also described.