A password authentication scheme against smart card security breach

Authors:
Jing Shen;Yusong Du
Affiliations:
South China Institute of Software Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou, P.R. China;School of Information Management, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, P.R. Chiney Lab of Network Security and Cryptology, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou, P.R. China
Venue:
ICICA'12 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Information Computing and Applications
Year:
2012

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Abstract

Remote user authentication is very important for identifying whether communicating parties are genuine and trustworthy. Using a password and a smart card between a login user and a remote server is necessary. Recently, C.T. Li et al.'s noted that smart card security breach was not considered in the password authentication scheme given by S.K. Kim et al.'s in 2009, then they proposed a remote user authentication scheme against smart card security breach, which was presented in Data and Applications Security and Privacy 2011. However, we note that Li et al.'s scheme needs a verification table in the remote server. It is well-known that a verification table should not be involved in a good password authentication scheme with smart cards. In this paper, we propose a password authentication scheme against smart card security breach and without maintaining verification tables.