On the (in)security of IDEA in various hashing modes

  • Authors:
  • Lei Wei;Thomas Peyrin;Przemysław Sokołowski;San Ling;Josef Pieprzyk;Huaxiong Wang

  • Affiliations:
  • Division of Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;Division of Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;Macquarie University, Australia;Division of Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;Macquarie University, Australia;Division of Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

  • Venue:
  • FSE'12 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

In this article, we study the security of the IDEA block cipher when it is used in various simple-length or double-length hashing modes. Even though this cipher is still considered as secure, we show that one should avoid its use as internal primitive for block cipher based hashing. In particular, we are able to generate instantaneously free-start collisions for most modes, and even semi-free-start collisions, pseudo-preimages or hash collisions in practical complexity. This work shows a practical example of the gap that exists between secret-key and known or chosen-key security for block ciphers. Moreover, we also settle the 20-year-old standing open question concerning the security of the Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM double-length compression functions, originally invented to be instantiated with IDEA. Our attacks have been verified experimentally and work even for strengthened versions of IDEA with any number of rounds.