Security margin evaluation of SHA-3 contest finalists through SAT-Based attacks

Authors:
Ekawat Homsirikamol;Paweł Morawiecki;Marcin Rogawski;Marian Srebrny
Affiliations:
Cryptographic Engineering Research Group, George Mason University;Section of Informatics, University of Commerce, Kielce, Poland;Cryptographic Engineering Research Group, George Mason University;Section of Informatics, University of Commerce, Kielce, Poland,Institute of Computer Science, Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland
Venue:
CISIM'12 Proceedings of the 11th IFIP TC 8 international conference on Computer Information Systems and Industrial Management
Year:
2012

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Abstract

In 2007, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a public contest aiming at the selection of a new standard for a cryptographic hash function. In this paper, the security margin of five SHA-3 finalists is evaluated with an assumption that attacks launched on finalists should be practically verified. A method of attacks is called logical cryptanalysis where the original task is expressed as a SATisfiability problem. To simplify the most arduous stages of this type of cryptanalysis and helps to mount the attacks in a uniform way a new toolkit is used. In the context of SAT-based attacks, it has been shown that all the finalists have substantially bigger security margin than the current standards SHA-256 and SHA-1.