Progress in approximate nash equilibria
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Nash equilibria in random games
Random Structures & Algorithms
Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A note on approximate Nash equilibria
Theoretical Computer Science
New algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games
Theoretical Computer Science
The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
SIAM Journal on Computing
Efficient algorithms for constant well supported approximate equilibria in bimatrix games
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies
Theoretical Computer Science
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In an ε-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most ε by changing his behaviour. Recent work has addressed the question of how best to compute ε-Nash equilibria, and for what values of ε a polynomial-time algorithm exists. An ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium (ε-WSNE) has the additional requirement that any strategy that is used with non-zero probability by a player must have payoff at most ε less than a best response. A recent algorithm of Kontogiannis and Spirakis shows how to compute a 2/3-WSNE in polynomial time, for bimatrix games. Here we introduce a new technique that leads to an improvement to the worst-case approximation guarantee.