Progress in approximate nash equilibria

  • Authors:
  • Constantinos Daskalakis;Aranyak Mehta;Christos Papadimitriou

  • Affiliations:
  • UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA;IBM Almaden, San Jose, CA;UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

It is known [5] that an additively ε-approximate Nash equilibrium (with supports of size at most two) can be computed in polynomial time in any 2-player game with ε=.5. It is also known that no approximation better than .5 is possible unless equilibria with support larger than logn are considered, where n is the number of strategies per player. We give a polynomial algorithm for computing an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in 2-player games with ε ≈ .38; our algorithm computes equilibria with arbitrarily large supports.