A note on approximate nash equilibria

  • Authors:
  • Constantinos Daskalakis;Aranyak Mehta;Christos Papadimitriou

  • Affiliations:
  • University of California, Berkeley;IBM Almaden Research Center, San Jose;University of California, Berkeley

  • Venue:
  • WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
  • Year:
  • 2006

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In view of the intractability of finding a Nash equilibrium, it is important to understand the limits of approximation in this context. A subexponential approximation scheme is known [LMM03], and no approximation better than is possible by any algorithm that examines equilibria involving fewer than logn strategies [Alt94]. We give a simple, linear-time algorithm examining just two strategies per player and resulting in a -approximate Nash equilibrium in any 2-player game. For the more demanding notion of well-supported approximate equilibrium due to [DGP06] no nontrivial bound is known; we show that the problem can be reduced to the case of win-lose games (games with all utilities 0–1), and that an approximation of is possible contingent upon a graph-theoretic conjecture.