Approximate Equilibria for Strategic Two Person Games

  • Authors:
  • Paul G. Spirakis

  • Affiliations:
  • Research Academic Computer Technology Institute, Patra University Campus, Rio-Patra, Greece 26500

  • Venue:
  • SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
  • Year:
  • 2008

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In view of the apparent intractability of constructing Nash Equilibria (NE in short) in polynomial time, even for bimatrix games, understanding the limitations of the approximability of the problem is an important challenge. The purpose of this document is to review a set of results, which have contributed significantly, and currently are the state-of-art with respect to the polynomial time construction of approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. Most of the results discussed here are joint work of the author and of the union of his coauthors in various papers, namely S. Kontogiannis, P. Panagopoulou and H. Tsaknakis.