Nash Equilibria in Random Games

  • Authors:
  • Imre Barany;Santosh Vempala;Adrian Vetta

  • Affiliations:
  • Imre Barany;MIT;Adrian Vetta

  • Venue:
  • FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

We consider Nash equilibria in 2-player random games and analyze a simple Las Vegas algorithm for finding an equilibrium. The algorithm is combinatorial and always finds a Nash equilibrium; on m x n payoff matrices,it runs in time O(a^2 n\log \log n + n^2 m\log \log n) with high probability. Our main tool is a polytope formulation of equilibria.