Unconditionally secure rational secret sharing in standard communication networks

Authors:
Zhifang Zhang;Mulan Liu
Affiliations:
Key Laboratory of Mathematics Mechanization, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, CAS, Beijing, China and State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Beijing, China;Key Laboratory of Mathematics Mechanization, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, CAS, Beijing, China
Venue:
ICISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Year:
2010

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Abstract

Rational secret sharing protocols in both the two-party and multi-party settings are proposed. These protocols are built in standard communication networks and with unconditional security.Namely, the protocols run over standard point-to-point networks without requiring physical assumptions or simultaneous channels, and even a computationally unbounded player cannot gain more than ε by deviating from the protocol. More precisely, for the 2-out-of-2 protocol the ε is a negligible function in the size of the secret, which is caused by the information-theoreticMACs used for authentication. The t-out-of-n protocol is (t-1)-resilient and the ε is exponentially small in the number of participants. Although secret recovery cannot be guaranteed in this setting, a participant can at least reduce the Shannon entropy of the secret to less than 1 after the protocol. When the secret-domain is large, every rational player has great incentive to participate in the protocol.