Efficient oblivious transfer protocols
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Practical byzantine fault tolerance and proactive recovery
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Towards a scalable and robust DHT
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Distributed Key Generation for the Internet
ICDCS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 29th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Practical Robust Communication in DHTs Tolerating a Byzantine Adversary
ICDCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 30th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Making chord robust to byzantine attacks
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Automatic Reconfiguration for Large-Scale Reliable Storage Systems
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Adding query privacy to robust DHTs
Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Adding query privacy to robust DHTs
Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
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Interest in anonymous communication over distributed hash tables (DHTs) has increased in recent years. However, almost all known solutions solely aim at achieving sender or requestor anonymity in DHT queries. In many application scenarios, it is crucial that the queried key remains secret from intermediate peers that (help to) route the queries towards their destinations. In this paper, we satisfy this requirement by presenting an approach for providing privacy for the keys in DHT queries. We use the concept of oblivious transfer (OT) in communication over DHTs to preserve query privacy without compromising spam resistance. Although our OT-based approach can work over any DHT, we concentrate on robust DHTs that can tolerate Byzantine faults and resist spam. We choose the best-known robust DHT construction, and employ an efficient OT protocol well-suited for achieving our goal of obtaining query privacy over robust DHTs. Finally, we compare the performance of our privacy-preserving protocols with their more privacy-invasive counterparts. We observe that there is no increase in the message complexity and only a small overhead in the computational complexity.