CARMA: a hardware tamper-resistant isolated execution environment on commodity x86 platforms

Authors:
Amit Vasudevan;Jonathan McCune;James Newsome;Adrian Perrig;Leendert van Doorn
Affiliations:
CyLab/CMU;CyLab/CMU;CyLab/CMU;CyLab/CMU;AMD
Venue:
Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Year:
2012

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Abstract

Much effort has been spent to reduce the software Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of modern systems. However, there remains a large and complex hardware TCB, including memory, peripherals, and system buses. There are many stronger, but still realistic, adversary models where we need to consider that this hardware may be malicious or compromised. Thus, there is a practical need to determine whether we can achieve secure program execution in the presence of not only malicious software, but also malicious hardware.