Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters
PODC '86 Proceedings of the fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Limits on the provable consequences of one-way permutations
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A protocol for anonymous communication over the Internet
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
A robust and verifiable cryptographically secure election scheme
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
How to generate and exchange secrets
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Cryptographic Complexity of Multi-Party Computation Problems: Classifications and Separations
CRYPTO 2008 Proceedings of the 28th Annual conference on Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
A zero-one law for cryptographic complexity with respect to computational UC security
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
A universally composable scheme for electronic cash
INDOCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Cryptology in India
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Cryptography has developed numerous protocols for solving "partial information games" that are seemingly paradoxical. Some protocols are generic (e.g., secure multi-party computation) and others, due to the importance of the scenario they represent, are designed to solve a concrete problem directly. Designing efficient and secure protocols for (off-line) e-cash, e-voting, and e-auction are some of the most heavily researched concrete problems, representing various settings where privacy and correctness of the procedure is highly important. In this work, we initiate the exploration of the relationships among e-cash, e-voting and e-auction in the universal composability (UC) framework, by considering general variants of the three problems. In particular, we first define ideal functionalities for e-cash, e-voting, and e-auction, and then give a construction of a protocol that UC-realizes the e-voting (resp., e-auction) functionality in the e-cash hybrid model. This (black-box) reducibility demonstrates the centrality of off-line e-cash and implies that designing a solution to e-cash may bear fruits in other areas. Constructing a solution to one protocol problem based on a second protocol problem has been traditional in cryptography, but typically has concentrated on building complex protocols on simple primitives (e.g., secure multi-party computation from Oblivious Transfer, signature from one-way functions, etc.). The novelty here is reducibility among mature protocols and using the ideal functionality as a design tool in realizing other ideal functionalities. We suggest this new approach, and we only consider the very basic general properties from the various primitives to demonstrate its viability. Namely, we only consider the basic coin e-cash model, the e-voting that is correct and private and relies on trusted registration, and e-auction relying on a trusted auctioneer. Naturally, relationships among protocols with further properties (i.e., extended functionalities), using the approach advocated herein, are left as open questions.