The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems
STOC '85 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Composition and integrity preservation of secure reactive systems
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A note on the confinement problem
Communications of the ACM
Universally composable two-party and multi-party secure computation
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Parallel Reducibility for Information-Theoretically Secure Computation
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
New notions of security: achieving universal composability without trusted setup
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Collusion-Free Protocols in the Mediated Model
CRYPTO 2008 Proceedings of the 28th Annual conference on Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Relationship of Three Cryptographic Channels in the UC Framework
ProvSec '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Provable Security
Composability and On-Line Deniability of Authentication
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Collusion-Free Multiparty Computation in the Mediated Model
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universally composable security with global setup
TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Bi-deniable public-key encryption
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
A formal treatment of onion routing
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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The traditional approach to formalizing ideal-model based definitions of security for multi-party protocols models adversaries (both real and ideal) as centralized entities that control all parties that deviate from the protocol. While this centralized-adversary modeling suffices for capturing basic security properties such as secrecy of local inputs and correctness of outputs against coordinated attacks, it turns out to be inadequate for capturing security properties that involve restricting the sharing of information between separate adversarial entities. Indeed, to capture collusion-freeness and game-theoretic solution concepts, Alwen et al. [Crypto, 2012] propose a new ideal-model based definitional framework that involves a de-centralized adversary. We propose an alternative framework to that of Alwen et al. We then observe that our framework allows capturing not only collusion-freeness and game-theoretic solution concepts, but also several other properties that involve the restriction of information flow among adversarial entities. These include some natural flavors of anonymity, deniability, timing separation, and information-confinement. We also demonstrate the inability of existing formalisms to capture these properties. We then prove strong composition properties for the proposed framework, and use these properties to demonstrate the security, within the new framework, of two very different protocols for securely evaluating any function of the parties' inputs.