New notions of security: achieving universal composability without trusted setup

  • Authors:
  • Manoj Prabhakaran;Amit Sahai

  • Affiliations:
  • Princeton University, Princeton, NJ;Princeton University, Princeton, NJ

  • Venue:
  • STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

We propose a modification to the framework of Universally Composable (UC) security [3]. Our new notion involves comparing the real protocol execution with an ideal execution involving ideal functionalities (just as in UC-security), but allowing the environment and adversary access to some super-polynomial computational power. We argue the meaningfulness of the new notion, which in particular subsumes many of the traditional notions of security. We generalize the Universal Composition theorem of [3] to the new setting. Then under new computational assumptions, we realize secure multi-party computation (for static adversaries) without a common reference string or any other set-up assumptions, in the new framework. This is known to be impossible under the UC framework.