A randomized protocol for signing contracts
Communications of the ACM
The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems
SIAM Journal on Computing
One-way functions are necessary and sufficient for secure signatures
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Non-interactive and non-malleable commitment
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiple NonInteractive Zero Knowledge Proofs Under General Assumptions
SIAM Journal on Computing
SIAM Journal on Computing
Constant-Round Coin-Tossing with a Man in the Middle or Realizing the Shared Random String Model
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Efficient Non-malleable Commitment Schemes
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Robust Non-interactive Zero Knowledge
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient and Non-interactive Non-malleable Commitment
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Non-interactive and reusable non-malleable commitment schemes
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Non-Malleable Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge and Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Security
FOCS '99 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
How to Go Beyond the Black-Box Simulation Barrier
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
New and improved constructions of non-malleable cryptographic protocols
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Strengthening Zero-Knowledge Protocols Using Signatures
Journal of Cryptology
Constant-Round Concurrent Non-malleable Zero Knowledge in the Bare Public-Key Model
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part II
Simulation-Based Concurrent Non-malleable Commitments and Decommitments
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the concurrent composition of zero-knowledge proofs
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Concurrent non-malleable commitments from any one-way function
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Concurrent non-malleable zero knowledge proofs
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
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Non-malleable witness indistinguishability (NMWI) is a security notion against man-in-the-middle attacks which requires that the witness encoded in the right interaction is computationally independent of that used by honest prover in the left. In STOC 2009, Lin et al. defined strongly non-malleable witness indistinguishability (SNMWI) which is similar in spirit to NMWI, and proposed a SNMWI scheme based on one-way function. In this paper, we firstly show that the two notions NMWI and SNMWI are incomparable: there exists a SNMWI argument which is not NMWI, and vice versa. Furthermore, it is pointed out that the SNMWI construction given in STOC 2009 is not NMWI. Then, we present a variant of LPV08 scheme [17] and show that this variant is a concurrent NMWI argument. Compared with the concurrent NMWI argument of [22] which was shown to be non-malleable by using non-black-box techniques and whose difficulty assumption was claw-free permutation, our new scheme is based on the existence of one-way functions and its proof of security relies on black-box techniques.