Cookie-proxy: a scheme to prevent SSLStrip attack

  • Authors:
  • Sendong Zhao;Ding Wang;Sicheng Zhao;Wu Yang;Chunguang Ma

  • Affiliations:
  • College of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin City, China;College of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin City, China;School of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin City, China;College of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin City, China;College of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin City, China

  • Venue:
  • ICICS'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information and Communications Security
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

A new Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack called SSLStrip poses a serious threat to the security of secure socket layer protocol. Although some researchers have presented some schemes to resist such attack, until now there is still no practical countermeasure. To withstand SSLStrip attack, in this paper we propose a scheme named Cookie-Proxy, including a secure cookie protocol and a new topology structure. The topology structure is composed of a proxy pattern and a reverse proxy pattern. Experiment results and formal security proof using SVO logic show that our scheme is effective to prevent SSLStrip attack. Besides, our scheme spends little extra time cost and little extra communication cost comparing with previous secure cookie protocols.