Dos and don'ts of client authentication on the web

  • Authors:
  • Kevin Fu;Emil Sit;Kendra Smith;Nick Feamster

  • Affiliations:
  • MIT Laboratory of Computer Science;MIT Laboratory of Computer Science;MIT Laboratory of Computer Science;MIT Laboratory of Computer Science

  • Venue:
  • SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

Client authentication has been a continuous source of problems on the Web. Although many well-studied techniques exist for authentication, Web sites continue to use extremely weak authentication schemes, especially in non-enterprise environments such as store fronts. These weaknesses often result from careless use of authenticators within Web cookies. Of the twenty-seven sites we investigated, we weakened the client authentication on two systems, gained unauthorized access on eight, and extracted the secret key used to mint authenticators from one. We provide a description of the limitations, requirements, and security models specific to Web client authentication. This includes the introduction of the interrogative adversary, a surprisingly powerful adversary that can adaptively query a Web site. We propose a set of hints for designing a secure client authentication scheme. Using these hints, we present the design and analysis of a simple authentication scheme secure against forgeries by the interrogative adversary. In conjunction with SSL, our scheme is secure against forgeries by the active adversary.