On fixed-price marketing for goods with positive network externalities

  • Authors:
  • Vahab S. Mirrokni;Sebastien Roch;Mukund Sundararajan

  • Affiliations:
  • Google Research, New York;Department of Mathematics, UW---Madison;Google Research, Mountain View

  • Venue:
  • WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

In this paper we discuss marketing strategies for goods that have positive network externalities, i.e., when a buyer's value for an item is positively influenced by others owning the item. We investigate revenue-optimal strategies of a specific form where the seller gives the item for free to a set of users, and then sets a fixed price for the rest. We present a $1\over 2$-approximation for this problem under assumptions about the form of the externality. To do so, we apply ideas from the influence maximization literature [13] and also use a recent result on non-negative submodular maximization as a black-box [3,7].