Improving Service by Informing Customers About Anticipated Delays
Management Science
The Downs-Thomson Paradox: Existence, Uniqueness and Stability of User Equilibria
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
Vacation Queueing Models: Theory and Applications (International Series in Operations Research & Management Science)
Contact Centers with a Call-Back Option and Real-Time Delay Information
Operations Research
On balking from an empty queue
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
Equilibrium customer strategies in a single server Markovian queue with setup times
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
Analysis and Comparison of Queues with Different Levels of Delay Information
Management Science
Performance Analysis of a Queue with Congestion-Based Staffing Policy
Management Science
The Impact of Delay Announcements in Many-Server Queues with Abandonment
Operations Research
Real-Time Delay Estimation Based on Delay History
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Joining Longer Queues: Information Externalities in Queue Choice
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Strategic Behavior and Social Optimization in Markovian Vacation Queues
Operations Research
Modeling Security-Check Queues
Management Science
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We study strategic customer behavior in a multiserver stochastic service system with a congestion-based staffing CBS policy. With the CBS policy, the number of working servers is dynamically adjusted according to the queue length. Besides lining up for free service, customers have the option of paying a fee and getting faster service. Customers' equilibrium behavior is studied under two information scenarios: In the no information scenario, customers only know the long-term statistics, such as the expected waiting time; in the partial information scenario, customers observe the number of working servers and understand the staffing policy upon their arrival. Unlike a queueing system with a constant staffing level, a positive externality is associated with customers' joining the CBS system. Both avoid-the-crowd and follow-the-crowd customer behaviors are possible, and multiple equilibria could exist. We develop the stationary performance measures of the system by considering the customers' strategic behavior. Numerical analysis shows that information can either hurt or improve the performance of the system, depending on the staffing and pricing policy. Another important conclusion is that the system performance is more robust to setting a relatively high than a relatively low price.