An introduction to difference equations
An introduction to difference equations
On a batch arrival Poisson queue with a random setup time and vacation period
Computers and Operations Research
An MX/G/1 queueing system with a setup period and a vacation period
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
Analysis of M/G/1-Queues with Setup Times and Vacations under Six Different Service Disciplines
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
Analysis of a Multiserver Queue with Setup Times
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
Vacation Queueing Models: Theory and Applications (International Series in Operations Research & Management Science)
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
Strategic Behavior and Social Optimization in Markovian Vacation Queues
Operations Research
Non-cooperative spectrum access: the dedicated vs. free spectrum choice
MobiHoc '11 Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
Equilibrium balking strategies in the observable single-server queue with breakdowns and repairs
Operations Research Letters
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Equilibrium customer strategies in Markovian queues with partial breakdowns
Computers and Industrial Engineering
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We consider a single server Markovian queue with setup times. Whenever this system becomes empty, the server is turned off. Whenever a customer arrives to an empty system, the server begins an exponential setup time to start service again. We assume that arriving customers decide whether to enter the system or balk based on a natural reward-cost structure, which incorporates their desire for service as well as their unwillingness to wait. We examine customer behavior under various levels of information regarding the system state. Specifically, before making the decision, a customer may or may not know the state of the server and/or the number of present customers. We derive equilibrium strategies for the customers under the various levels of information and analyze the stationary behavior of the system under these strategies. We also illustrate further effects of the information level on the equilibrium behavior via numerical experiments.