Optimal incentive-compatible priority pricing for the M/M/1 queue
Operations Research
User delay costs and internal pricing for a service facility
Management Science
On the advantage of being the first server
Management Science
Contact Centers with a Call-Back Option and Real-Time Delay Information
Operations Research
Equilibrium customer strategies in a single server Markovian queue with setup times
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
Information And Uncertainty In A Queuing System
Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences
Analysis and Comparison of Queues with Different Levels of Delay Information
Management Science
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We consider the single server Markovian queue and we assume that arriving customers decide whether to enter the system or balk based on a natural reward-cost structure, which incorporates their desire for service as well as their unwillingness to wait.We suppose that the waiting space of the system is partitioned in compartments of fixed capacity for a customers. Before making his decision, a customer may or may not know the compartment in which he will enter and/or the position within the compartment in which he will enter. Thus, denoting by n the number of customers found by an arriving customer, he may or may not know 驴 n/a 驴+1 and/or (n mod a)+1.We examine customers' behavior under the various levels of information regarding the system state and we identify equilibrium threshold strategies. We also study the corresponding social and profit maximization problems.