Coordinating Investment, Production, and Subcontracting
Management Science
Multiprocessor Scheduling with Rejection
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Preemptive multiprocessor scheduling with rejection
Theoretical Computer Science
Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain
Management Science
Scheduling Problems with Two Competing Agents
Operations Research
A survey of scheduling with controllable processing times
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Coordination of Outsourced Operations to Minimize Weighted Flow Time and Capacity Booking Costs
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
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Consider a set of manufacturers, all of which can subcontract part of their workload to a third party. For simplicity, we assume that every manufacturer as well as the third party each possess a single production facility. Each manufacturer has to decide the amount of workload to be subcontracted so as to minimize the completion time of his in-house and subcontracted workloads. In an effort to provide good service to all, the third party gives priority to manufacturers whose subcontracted workload is small. This incentive scheme forces manufacturers to compete for position in the third-party processing sequence. We develop pure Nash equilibria schedules under three distinct protocols for production.