How to break the direct RSA-implementation of mixes
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Efficient anonymous channel and all/nothing election scheme
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
An optimally robust hybrid mix network
Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
SAC '98 Proceedings of the Selected Areas in Cryptography
An Efficient Scheme for Proving a Shuffle
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Mix and Match: Secure Function Evaluation via Ciphertexts
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Optimistic Mixing for Exit-Polls
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
How to Make Personalized Web Browising Simple, Secure, and Anonymous
FC '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Financial Cryptography
A practical scheme for non-interactive verifiable secret sharing
SFCS '87 Proceedings of the 28th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
IEEE Security and Privacy
Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme: a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
How to break a practical MIX and design a new one
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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We study mix-nets with randomized partial checking (RPC) as proposed by Jakobsson, Juels, and Rivest (2002). RPC is a technique to verify the correctness of an execution both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. The idea is to relax the correctness and privacy requirements to achieve a more efficient mix-net. We identify serious issues in the original description of mix-nets with RPC and show how to exploit these to break both correctness and privacy, both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. Our attacks are practical and applicable to real world mix-net implementations, e.g., the Civitas and the Scantegrity voting systems.