A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
How to break the direct RSA-implementation of mixes
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Efficient anonymous channel and all/nothing election scheme
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM
SAC '98 Proceedings of the Selected Areas in Cryptography
A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Mix-Networks on Permutation Networks
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Fault tolerant anonymous channel
ICICS '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Information and Communication Security
Millimix: Mixing in Small Batches
Millimix: Mixing in Small Batches
Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme: a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
How to break a practical MIX and design a new one
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Targeted Advertising ... And Privacy Too
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Electronic Jury Voting Protocols
LATIN '02 Proceedings of the 5th Latin American Symposium on Theoretical Informatics
The Security of a Mix-Center Based on a Semantically Secure Cryptosystem
INDOCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Cryptology: Progress in Cryptology
Optimistic Mixing for Exit-Polls
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Remarks on Mix-Network Based on Permutation Networks
PKC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Proving a Shuffle Using Representations of the Symmetric Group
Information Security and Cryptology --- ICISC 2008
A sender verifiable mix-net and a new proof of a shuffle
ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
On flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix networks
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
SAS: a scalar anonymous communication system
ICCNMC'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Networking and Mobile Computing
A practical voting scheme with receipts
ISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security
Cryptanalysis of a universally verifiable efficient re-encryption mixnet
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
A mix-net from any CCA2 secure cryptosystem
ASIACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Randomized partial checking revisited
CT-RSA'13 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Topics in Cryptology
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A MIX net takes a list of ciphertexts (c1, . . . , cN) and outputs a permuted list of the plaintexts (m1, . . . , mN) without revealing the relationship between (c1, . . . , cN) and (m1, . . . , mN). This paper shows that the Jakobsson's flash MIX of PODC'99, which was believed to be the most efficient robust MIX net, is broken. The first MIX server can prevent computing the correct output with probability 1 in our attack. We also present a countermeasure for our attack.