Model checking
A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
A dynamic information flow model of secure systems
ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Principles of Model Checking (Representation and Mind Series)
Principles of Model Checking (Representation and Mind Series)
Spin model checker, the: primer and reference manual
Spin model checker, the: primer and reference manual
Verifying the Microsoft Hyper-V Hypervisor with VCC
FM '09 Proceedings of the 2nd World Congress on Formal Methods
A decade of software model checking with SLAM
Communications of the ACM
Formal methods for security in the Xenon hypervisor
International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer (STTT) - VSTTE 2009
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Hypervisors act a central role in virtualization for cloud computing. However, current security solutions, such as installing IDS model on hypervisors to detect known and unknown attacks, can not be applied well to the virtualized environments. Whats more, people have not raised enough concern about vulnerabilities of hypervisors themselves. Existing works mainly focusing on hypervisors' code analysis can only verify the correctness, rather than security, or only be suitable for open-source hypervisors. In this paper, we design a binary analysis tool using formal methods to discover vulnerabilities of hypervisors. In the scheme, Z notation, VDM, B, Object-Z or CSP formalism can be utilized as suitable modeling and specification languages. Our proposal sequently follows the process of disassembly, modeling, specification, and verification. Finally, the effectiveness of the method is demonstrated by detecting the vulnerability of Xen-3.3.0 in which a bug is added.