Selfish caching in distributed systems: a game-theoretic analysis
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A survey of peer-to-peer content distribution technologies
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Free Riding on Gnutella Revisited: The Bell Tolls?
IEEE Distributed Systems Online
Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Replica management should be a game
EW 10 Proceedings of the 10th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
ICPADS '06 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems - Volume 1
Understanding churn in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks: a game theoretic approach
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
An Evolutionary Game Model of Resources-sharing Mechanism in P2P Networks
IITA '07 Proceedings of the Workshop on Intelligent Information Technology Application
A Review of Incentive Mechanism in Peer-to-Peer Systems
AP2PS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 First International Conference on Advances in P2P Systems
P2P soft security: On evolutionary dynamics of P2P incentive mechanism
Computer Communications
Review: A survey on content-centric technologies for the current Internet: CDN and P2P solutions
Computer Communications
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In order to cope with the free-riding problem in file sharing P2P systems, two kinds of incentive mechanisms have been proposed: reciprocity based and currency based. The main goal of this work was to study the impact of those incentive mechanisms in the emergence of cooperation in file sharing P2P systems. For each kind of incentive mechanism we designed a game and the outcome of this game was used as a fitness function to carry out an evolutionary process. We were able to observe that the Currency Game obtains an enough cooperative population slightly faster than the Reciprocity Game but, in the long run, the Reciprocity Game outperforms the Currency Game because the final populations under the former are consistently more cooperative than the final populations produced by the latter.