Sustaining cooperation on networks: an analytical study based on evolutionary game theory
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Design of an incentive mechanism to promote honesty in e-marketplaces with limited inventory
Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Conference on Electronic Commerce
Combining Trust Modeling And Mechanism Design For Promoting Honesty In E-Marketplaces
Computational Intelligence
Robustness evaluation of incentive mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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In e-marketplaces, reputation systems are prevalently applied to assist buyers to model seller trustworthiness based on ratings shared by other buyers. However, dishonest buyers may share untruthful ratings. Many incentive mechanisms have been proposed to elicit truthful ratings from buyers. These mechanisms have a common implicit assumption that sellers can provide a large number of products. In reality, e-markets with limited inventory exist in many scenarios. For example, dentist booking in US, as a marketplace, has been observed the phenomenon that the service demand is much larger than the service supply, and the second-hand markets where some used and workable goods (e.g., second-hand textbooks) are often in short supply due to lower prices. We call a marketplace in which the demand outweighs the supply a marketplace with limited inventory. In such marketplaces, buyers may lose profit if they provide truthful ratings due to competition from other buyers for the limited products provided by trustworthy sellers. In other words, providing truthful ratings is costly. The existing incentive mechanisms seldom consider such cost imposed on providing truthful ratings, which motivates us to design a new incentive mechanism for e-marketplaces with limited inventory. Moreover, a general assumption for incentive mechanisms is that every agent is rational and has the belief that others are also rational. However, in a realistic scenario, some agents may be irrational (bounded rationality or adversary), which may impede the efficiency of the mechanisms. In all, the aim of our research is to design an incentive mechanism for e-marketplaces with limited inventory that is robust against irrational agents.