A Computational Model of Trust and Reputation for E-businesses
HICSS '02 Proceedings of the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'02)-Volume 7 - Volume 7
Effect of the food traceability system for building trust: Price premium and buying behavior
Information Systems Frontiers
Trust representation and aggregation in a distributed agent system
AAAI'06 proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Design of a mechanism for promoting honesty in E-marketplaces
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Adaptive Strategies for Dynamic Pricing Agents
WI-IAT '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
No Free Lunch: Price Premium for Privacy Seal-Bearing Vendors
Journal of Management Information Systems
Towards the design of a robust incentive mechanism for e-marketplaces with limited inventory
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Hi-index | 0.00 |
In e-marketplaces with limited inventory where buyers' demand is larger than sellers' supply, promoting honesty raises new challenges: sellers may behave dishonestly because they can sell out all products without the necessity of gaining high reputation; buyers may provide untruthful ratings to mislead other buyers in order to have a higher chance to obtain the limited products. In this paper, we propose a novel incentive mechanism to promote honesty in such e-marketplaces. More specifically, our mechanism models both buyer and seller honesty. It offers higher prices to the products provided by honest sellers so that the sellers can gain more profit. Honest buyers also have a higher chance to do business with honest sellers and are able to gain more utility. Theoretical analysis and experimental results show that our mechanism promotes both buyer and seller honesty. Finally, we address the re-entry problem by imposing membership fees on new sellers. We show that the membership fee can discourage sellers from re-entry both in theoretical analysis and experimental validation.