Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Invasive browser sniffing and countermeasures
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on World Wide Web
Protecting browser state from web privacy attacks
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on World Wide Web
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
Inferring private information using social network data
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
De-anonymizing Social Networks
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
You are who you know: inferring user profiles in online social networks
Proceedings of the third ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
Tweet, Tweet, Retweet: Conversational Aspects of Retweeting on Twitter
HICSS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 43rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
A Practical Attack to De-anonymize Social Network Users
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
DNS prefetching and its privacy implications: when good things go bad
LEET'10 Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats: botnets, spyware, worms, and more
You are where you tweet: a content-based approach to geo-locating twitter users
CIKM '10 Proceedings of the 19th ACM international conference on Information and knowledge management
Web browser history detection as a real-world privacy threat
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Tweets from Justin Bieber's heart: the dynamics of the location field in user profiles
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
"You Might Also Like: " Privacy Risks of Collaborative Filtering
SP '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
Inferring privacy information from social networks
ISI'06 Proceedings of the 4th IEEE international conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics
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Twitter is a popular social network service for sharing messages among friends. Because Twitter restricts the length of messages, many Twitter users use URL shortening services, such as bit.ly and goo.gl, to share long URLs with friends. Some URL shortening services also provide click analytics of the shortened URLs, including the number of clicks, countries, platforms, browsers and referrers. To protect visitors' privacy, they do not reveal identifying information about individual visitors. In this paper, we propose a practical attack technique that can infer who clicks what shortened URLs on Twitter. Unlike the conventional browser history stealing attacks, our attack methods only need publicly available information provided by URL shortening services and Twitter. Evaluation results show that our attack technique can compromise Twitter users' privacy with high accuracy.