DNS prefetching and its privacy implications: when good things go bad

  • Authors:
  • Srinivas Krishnan;Fabian Monrose

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill;Department of Computer Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

  • Venue:
  • LEET'10 Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats: botnets, spyware, worms, and more
  • Year:
  • 2010

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

A recent trend in optimizing Internet browsing speed is to optimistically pre-resolve (or prefetch) DNS resolutions. While the practical benefits of doing so are still being debated, this paper attempts to raise awareness that current practices could lead to privacy threats that are ripe for abuse. More specifically, although the adoption of several browser optimizations have already raised security concerns, we examine how prefetching amplifies disclosure attacks to a degree where it is possible to infer the likely search terms issued by clients using a given DNS resolver. The success of these inference attacks relies on the fact that prefetching inserts a significant amount of context into a resolver's cache, allowing an adversary to glean far more detailed insights than when this feature is turned off.