Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Social and Economic Networks
How Bad is Forming Your Own Opinion?
FOCS '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in atomic splittable congestion games
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Natural algorithms and influence systems
Communications of the ACM
Biased assimilation, homophily, and the dynamics of polarization
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
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We present game-theoretic models of opinion formation in social networks where opinions themselves co-evolve with friendships. In these models, nodes form their opinions by maximizing agreements with friends weighted by the strength of the relationships, which in turn depend on difference in opinion with the respective friends. We define a social cost of this process by generalizing recent work of Bindel et al., FOCS 2011. We tightly bound the price of anarchy of the resulting dynamics via local smoothness arguments, and characterize it as a function of how much nodes value their own (intrinsic) opinion, as well as how strongly they weigh links to friends with whom they agree more.