Complexity and Ecosystem Management: The Theory and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems
Complexity and Ecosystem Management: The Theory and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems
Developing multiagent systems: The Gaia methodology
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Environment as a first class abstraction in multiagent systems
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
The Tools of Government in the Digital Age: Second Edition (Public Policy and Politics)
The Tools of Government in the Digital Age: Second Edition (Public Policy and Politics)
Towards an abstract recursive agent
Integrated Computer-Aided Engineering
Agent Architectures for Compliance
ESAW '09 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Engineering Societies in the Agents World X
Robotics and Autonomous Systems
BWSS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 Second Brazilian Workshop on Social Simulation
HoloMAS'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Holonic and Multi-Agent Systems for Manufacturing
A Formal Model for Situated Multi-Agent Systems
Fundamenta Informaticae - Multiagent Systems (FAMAS'03)
Hi-index | 0.00 |
In a networked society, governing advocacy groups and networks through decentralized systems of policy implementation has been the interest of governance network literature. This paper addresses the topic of governing networks in the context of Indian agrarian societies by taking the case example of a welfare scheme for the Indian rural poor. We explore context-specific regulatory dynamics through the situated agent based architectural framework. The effects of various regulatory strategies that can be adopted by governing node are tested under various action arenas through experimental design. Results show the impact of regulatory strategies on the resource dependencies and asymmetries in the network relationships. This indicates that the optimal feasible regulatory strategy in networked society is institutionally rational and is context dependent. Further, we show that situated MAS architecture is a natural fit for institutional understanding of the dynamics (Ostrom et al. in Rules, games, and common-pool resources, 1994).