Improving the security of arbitrated quantum signature against the forgery attack

Authors:
Ke-Jia Zhang;Wei-Wei Zhang;Dan Li
Affiliations:
State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China 100190 and State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing Uni ...;State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China 100876;State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China 100876
Venue:
Quantum Information Processing
Year:
2013

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Abstract

As a feasible model for signing quantum messages, some cryptanalysis and improvement of arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) have received a great deal of attentions in recent years. However, in this paper we find the previous improvement is not suitable implemented in some typical AQS protocols in the sense that the receiver, Bob, can forge a valid signature under known message attack. We describe the forgery strategy and present some corresponding improved strategies to stand against the forgery attack by modifying the encryption algorithm, an important part of AQS. These works preserve the merits of AQS and lead some potential improvements of the security in quantum signature or other cryptography problems.