Some attacks on quantum-based cryptographic protocols
Quantum Information & Computation
An information theoretical model for quantum secret sharing
Quantum Information & Computation
Proof of security of quantum key distribution with two-way classical communications
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Security of quantum secret sharing with two-particle entanglement against individual attacks
Quantum Information & Computation
Quantum private comparison protocol with d-dimensional Bell states
Quantum Information Processing
Comment on quantum private comparison protocols with a semi-honest third party
Quantum Information Processing
Multi-party quantum key agreement with bell states and bell measurements
Quantum Information Processing
Efficient quantum private comparison employing single photons and collective detection
Quantum Information Processing
Multiparty quantum key agreement with single particles
Quantum Information Processing
Quantum Information Processing
Cryptanalysis of dynamic quantum secret sharing
Quantum Information Processing
Quantum private comparison against decoherence noise
Quantum Information Processing
A quantum protocol for millionaire problem with Bell states
Quantum Information Processing
Improving the security of arbitrated quantum signature against the forgery attack
Quantum Information Processing
Quantum private comparison protocol based on entanglement swapping of $$d$$-level Bell states
Quantum Information Processing
Expansible quantum secret sharing network
Quantum Information Processing
Reexamination of arbitrated quantum signature: the impossible and the possible
Quantum Information Processing
Quantum Information Processing
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The ring-arrangement quantum secret sharing protocol in the paper [K. Brádler and M. Dušek (2004) J. Opt. B: Quantum Semiclass. Opt. 6 63] is analyzed and it is shown that this protocol is secure for any eavesdropper except for a dishonest participant. For example, by a special strategy, Bob can steal Charlie's portion of information without being detected and then recover Alice's secret by himself. We give a description of this strategy and point out a possible way to improve the protocol to stand against this attack.