Secure multi-party quantum computation
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A Simple Protocol for Secure Circuit Evaluation
STACS '88 Proceedings of the 5th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Secure Multiparty Quantum Computation with (Only) a Strict Honest Majority
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Quantum Information Processing
A simple participant attack on the brádler-dušek protocol
Quantum Information & Computation
New quantum private comparison protocol using EPR pairs
Quantum Information Processing
Verifiable quantum (k, n)-threshold secret sharing
Quantum Information Processing
Quantum Information Processing
Quantum private comparison against decoherence noise
Quantum Information Processing
A quantum protocol for millionaire problem with Bell states
Quantum Information Processing
Quantum private comparison protocol based on entanglement swapping of $$d$$-level Bell states
Quantum Information Processing
Cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment via pre- and post-selected quantum states
Quantum Information Processing
Differential phase shift quantum private comparison
Quantum Information Processing
Quantum Information Processing
Two-party quantum privacy comparison with polarization-entangled bell states and the coherent states
Quantum Information & Computation
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As an important branch of quantum cryptography, quantum private comparison (QPC) has recently received a lot of attention. In this paper we study the security of previous QPC protocols with a semi-honest third party (TP) from the viewpoint of secure multi-party computation and show that the assumption of a semi-honest TP is unreasonable. Without the unreasonable assumption of a semi-honest TP, one can easily find that the QPC protocol (Tseng et al. in Quantum Inf Process, 2011, doi: 10.1007/s11128-011-0251-0 ) has an obvious security flaw. Some suggestions about the design of QPC protocols are also given.