Efficient noise-tolerant learning from statistical queries
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
When selfish meets evil: byzantine players in a virus inoculation game
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On the Impact of Combinatorial Structure on Congestion Games
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Congestion games with malicious players
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Convergence time to Nash equilibrium in load balancing
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Algorithmic Game Theory
Fast convergence to nearly optimal solutions in potential games
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Non-cooperative Cost Sharing Games Via Subsidies
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
The Price of Malice in Linear Congestion Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Proceedings of the ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Convergence and approximation in potential games
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
The snowball effect of uncertainty in potential games
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Market sharing games applied to content distribution in ad hoc networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In this work, we study the degree to which small fluctuations in costs in well-studied potential games can impact the result of natural best-response and improved-response dynamics. We call this the Price of Uncertainty and study it in a wide variety of potential games including fair cost-sharing games, set-cover games, routing games, and job-scheduling games. We show that in certain cases, even extremely small fluctuations can have the ability to cause these dynamics to spin out of control and move to states of much higher social cost, whereas in other cases these dynamics are much more stable even to large degrees of fluctuation. We also consider the resilience of these dynamics to a small number of Byzantine players about which no assumptions are made. We show again a contrast between different games. In certain cases (e.g., fair cost-sharing, set-cover, job-scheduling) even a single Byzantine player can cause best-response dynamics to transition from low-cost states to states of substantially higher cost, whereas in others (e.g., the class of β-nice games, which includes routing, market-sharing and many others) these dynamics are much more resilient. Overall, our work can be viewed as analyzing the inherent resilience or safety of games to different kinds of imperfections in player behavior, player information, or in modeling assumptions made.