CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Threshold Cryptosystems Secure against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
FOCS '95 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Privacy preserving error resilient dna searching through oblivious automata
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Towards Practical Privacy for Genomic Computation
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Privacy-preserving genomic computation through program specialization
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Evaluating branching programs on encrypted data
TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Secure text processing with applications to private DNA matching
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure outsourcing of DNA searching via finite automata
DBSec'10 Proceedings of the 24th annual IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and applications security and privacy
(If) size matters: size-hiding private set intersection
PKC'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Practice and theory in public key cryptography conference on Public key cryptography
To release or not to release: evaluating information leaks in aggregate human-genome data
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Countering GATTACA: efficient and secure testing of fully-sequenced human genomes
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Text search protocols with simulation based security
PKC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
Towards secure bioinformatics services (short paper)
FC'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
A Cryptographic Approach to Securely Share and Query Genomic Sequences
IEEE Transactions on Information Technology in Biomedicine
A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Secure Management of Biomedical Data With Cryptographic Hardware
IEEE Transactions on Information Technology in Biomedicine
PRISM: privacy-preserving search in mapreduce
PETS'12 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Genodroid: are privacy-preserving genomic tests ready for prime time?
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
SCN'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Recent progress in genomics and bioinformatics is bringing complete and on-demand sequencing of human (and other) genomes closer and closer to reality. Despite exciting new opportunities, affordable and ubiquitous genome sequencing prompts some serious privacy and ethical concerns, owing to extreme sensitivity and uniqueness of genomic information. At the same time, new medical applications, such as personalized medicine, require testing genomes for specific markers that themselves represent sensitive (e.g., proprietary) material. This paper focuses on privacy challenges posed by such genetic tests. It presents a secure and efficient protocol called: Size- and Position-Hiding Private Substring Match- ing (SPH-PSM). This protocol allows two parties -- one with a digitized genome and the other with a set of DNA markers -- to conduct a test, such that the result is only learned by the former, and no other information is learned by either party. In particular, the genome owner does not even learn the size or the position of the markers, which makes SPH-PSM the first of its kind. Finally, we report on a prototype of the proposed technique which attests to its practicality.