Cryptanalysis of truong et al.'s fingerprint biometric remote authentication scheme using mobile device

  • Authors:
  • Muhammad Khurram Khan;Saru Kumari;Mridul K. Gupta;Fahad T. Bin Muhaya

  • Affiliations:
  • Center of Excellence in Information Assurance, King Saud University, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;Department of Mathematics, Agra College, Agra, Uttar Pradesh, India;Department of Mathematics, Chaudhary Charan Singh University, Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, India;Prince Muqrin Chair for IT Security, King Saud University, Saudi Arabia

  • Venue:
  • BICS'13 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Advances in Brain Inspired Cognitive Systems
  • Year:
  • 2013

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Abstract

In 2010, Chen et al. focused at the vulnerability of smart card based authentication systems owing to leakage of secret information from smart card. They proposed a scheme with a view to boost the security of such authentication systems. However, in 2012, Truong et al. found Chen et al.'s scheme weak at resisting replay attack and spoofing attacks; thereby they proposed an improved scheme to counterfeit these weaknesses. Undoubtedly, the improved scheme by Truong et al. is free from defects pointed out on Chen et al.'s scheme, but here we show that problems like impersonation attacks, password guessing, etc are adhered with its design. We show that Truong et al.'s scheme violates Chen et al.'s aim to get rid of information-leak hazard from the smart card or mobile device based authentication schemes.