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While the setting of this question may appear implausible, this is precisely the environment in which services that span multiple administrative domains (MAD) must function. In such services--which include applications such as content dissemination (e.g.., [2]), file backup (e.g., [6]), volunteer computing (e.g., [5]),multihop wireless networking (e.g., [4]), and Internet routing--resources are not under the control of a single administrative domain, so the necessary cooperation cannot simply be achieved by fiat. Instead, it is imperative that the service be structured so that nodes--which are administered by different, potentially selfish entities--have an incentive to help sustain it. Indeed, such issues are not imaginary: ample evidence suggests that a large number of peers will free-ride or deviate from the assigned protocol if it is in their interest to do so (e.g., [3,9,16,21]).