Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Optical Fault Induction Attacks
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Differential Fault Analysis of Trivium
Fast Software Encryption
Floating Fault Analysis of Trivium
INDOCRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
HST '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Fault analysis of grain-128 by targeting NFSR
AFRICACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Progress in cryptology in Africa
Optically enhanced position-locked power analysis
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
TMD-Tradeoff and state entropy loss considerations of streamcipher MICKEY
INDOCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Cryptology in India
A differential fault attack on the grain family of stream ciphers
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A differential fault attack on grain-128a using MACs
SPACE'12 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In this paper we present a differential fault attack on the stream cipher MICKEY 2.0 which is in eStream's hardware portfolio. While fault attacks have already been reported against the other two eStream hardware candidates Trivium and Grain, no such analysis is known for MICKEY. Using the standard assumptions for fault attacks, we show that if the adversary can induce random single bit faults in the internal state of the cipher, then by injecting around 216.7 faults and performing 232.5 computations on an average, it is possible to recover the entire internal state of MICKEY at the beginning of the key-stream generation phase. We further consider the scenario where the fault may affect at most three neighbouring bits and in that case we require around 218.4 faults on an average.